The capitalist left can't save a dying system

Capitalism – the mode of production that reigns over every country on the planet – is dying. In historic decline for over a century, the acceleration of its decay has been more and more visible for the last three decades and especially since the beginning of the 2020s, where its multiple crises – economic, military, ecological – are coming together to create a deadly whirlwind which is significantly exacerbating the threat of the destruction of humanity.

The ruling class in capitalism, the bourgeoisie, has no solution to this nightmarish scenario. Unable to offer any perspective for society, it is caught up in the desperate logic of a decomposing society: every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost! This has become the dominant rule in international relations, expressing itself in the extension of barbaric wars across the planet. But it is also the leading tendency within each nation: the ruling class is more and more divided into cliques and clans, each putting their own interests above the needs of the national capital; and this situation is making it increasingly difficult for the bourgeoisie to act as a unified class and maintain overall control of its political apparatus. The rise of populism in the last decade is the clearest product of this tendency: the populist parties are an embodiment of the irrationality and “no future” of capitalism, with their promulgation of the most absurd conspiracy theories and their increasingly violent rhetoric against the established parties. The more “responsible” factions of the ruling class are concerned about the rise of populism because its attitudes and policies are directly at odds with what’s left of the traditional consensus of bourgeois politics.

To take one example: imperialist strategy. One of the reasons why there is such opposition, within the American ruling class itself, to the return of Trump to the presidency, is that he would undermine the main planks of US policy on key question like strengthening NATO and supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia, while giving a free hand to the most aggressive factions of the Israeli bourgeoisie in the Middle East. Like Trump, Le Pen, Farage and other populists in Europe are also notoriously pro-Russian in their international outlook, which runs counter to the current policies of the most important Western states. With the US Democrats somewhat paralysed over whether or not to replace the aging Biden in time for the November election, a “Second Coming” of Donald Trump seems increasingly likely, opening the prospect of a further acceleration of chaos in international relations.

More generally, populism is the offspring of a growing disillusionment with the “political class”. It feeds off discontent with the venality and corruption of established politicians, their litany of broken promises, and their role in reducing the living standards for the majority of the population. Hence the populists’ claim to express a true rebellion of “the people” against the “elites” and their demagogic demands to improve the living standards of the “native” population by scapegoating and excluding migrants and foreigners.

Election results in Britain and France: a barrier to the populist upsurge?

The results of the elections in Britain and France show that the “responsible” factions of the ruling class are not prepared to lie down and concede defeat to the populists.

The British bourgeoisie has a long-standing reputation as the most experienced and intelligent ruling class in the world, a reputation which has outlasted Britain’s decline as a world power. In the 1980s, for example, the political and economic policies of Thatcherism, and the division of labour between the right in power and the left in opposition, served as an example to follow across the whole western bloc, most obviously in the USA itself. But the last few years have witnessed the Tory party, in its attempts to “contain” the rise of populism, become increasingly infected by it, notably thanks to the Brexit disaster and the incompetence and brazen lying of successive Tory premierships. In the space of less than five years, the Tories have gone from the huge victory of 2019 to the near wipeout of the 2024 elections, which has seen a Labour landslide and the biggest electoral defeat in Tory history. The Conservatives lost 251 seats and this included a number of former cabinet ministers (such as Grant Shapps and Jacob Rees-Mogg) and even a former prime minister (Liz Truss). In numerous constituencies the Tories finished third, behind the Liberal Democrats and, more significantly, Farage’s Reform UK.

In one of his first speeches as PM, Keir Starmer proclaimed that his government would fight to “make you believe again”. Fully aware of the very widespread cynicism towards politicians among the population, the Labour government is selling a vision of strong and stable government in contrast to the chaos of the last few years. It talks about “change” but it is extremely cautious in the promises it is making, and even more cautious about spending its way out of Britain’s economic problems. On foreign policy there will be almost no change at all in the previous government’s support for US and NATO policies towards Ukraine, the Middle East and China.

Labour’s ability to present itself as the new party of order and sensible government is an expression of the remaining intelligence of the British ruling class, its understanding that the Tory policy of controlling populism by injecting a whole number of populist themes into its own body has been a complete failure. In this sense it has added a few bricks to the barrier against the populist upsurge. But even in the UK, this is a very fragile barrier.

For one thing, the Labour landslide was based on a very low turn-out: only 60% of the electorate cast their vote, an indication that cynicism towards the political process remains very widespread. Secondly, it was very clear from the polls that the Labour vote was not founded on any great enthusiasm for its policies but was primarily motivated by a desire to get rid of the Tories. And perhaps most importantly, the Tories’ defeat was in part due to a widescale defection to Reform, boosted by Farage’s decision to take on the leadership of the party and stand in the election. Even though Reform only won 5 seats in parliament, they obtained 14.3% of the vote, putting them third in terms of total votes cast. Farage made it very clear that he didn’t expect to win many seats and that the fight against Labour (and the centre) has only just begun.

The British two-party system, with its “first past the post” principle, has long been advertised as a foundation stone of British political stability, a method of avoiding the turbulence of coalition politics which reigns in the many parliamentary systems based on proportional representation. In this case, the British approach has proved to be an effective block on smaller parties like Reform having a significant presence in parliament. But the two-party system also depends on the stability of the two main parties themselves, and what emerged from the 2024 election was a historic crippling of the Conservatives – a blow from which they may not recover.

Another key indication that we may not be in for a long period of “strong and stable” Labour rule is its attitude to the class struggle. Starmer, Angela Rayner (Deputy Prime Minister) and others may emphasise their personal working class origins, but this is more a counter to the populists’ claims that they “speak for ordinary people” than as a means of presenting Labour as a party of the working class, still less as a “socialist” party. Starmer’s Labour is very much a rehash of Blair’s New Labour, claiming to hold the ground of the “centre-left”, in opposition to the “left wing excesses” of Jeremy Corbyn which cost it dear in 2019. But in between 2019 and 2024 Britain has seen an important revival of class struggles which acted as beacon to workers’ resistance around the world. These struggles have died down but they are still simmering. The present Labour regime would not be well equipped ideologically to respond to a new outbreak of class movements and would find itself rapidly losing credibility as an improvement on the Tories.

In France, as in Britain, we have seen from within the bourgeois political apparatus a rather intelligent response to the rise of populism and the danger of Le Pen’s Rassemblement National winning a majority in parliament. The New Popular Front was cobbled together soon after Macron declared a snap election in response to the successes of RN in the EU elections. It brought together all the main forces of the left: the Socialist and Communist Parties, La France Insoumise, the Greens and some of the Trotskyist groups. After RN’s victory in the first round of the legislatives, they made a deal with Macron’s centre party, Renaissance, not to oppose each others’ candidates in the second round if it meant losing ground to the RN, and the manoeuvre worked: the RN failed to win a majority in the National Assembly

Does this mean that Macron’s gamble of calling the snap election has paid off? In fact, it has created an extremely uncertain situation in French bourgeois politics. Although the left and the centre were able to do a deal against the RN, Macron will face a divided parliament, made up of three main groupings which are in turn split into several sub-groups. This situation is thus still likely to make his job far more difficult than before. In contrast to Britain, France does not have a strong centre-left party because the Socialist Party was totally discredited by its years in power when it rained down attacks on the working class. The French Communist Party is also a shadow of its former self. The most dynamic force in the New Popular Front is La France Insoumise, which touts its working class and socialist credentials, its links to the workers’ struggles against the neo-liberal policies of Macron (for example, it calls for dropping the rise in the pension age to 64, a key issue in the recent strikes and demonstrations in France, and restoring it to 60). LFI is also highly critical of NATO and of the war in the Middle East, which does not make it a reliable supporter of Macron’s foreign policy. All this points to the conclusion that the French barrier against populism and political chaos is perhaps even more fragile than the British.

To some extent, the uncertainty facing the French political apparatus is a reflection of a more historically based weakness of the French bourgeoisie, which has not enjoyed the same political stability as its British counter-part and has been plagued by divisions between particular interests for much longer.  One of the reasons why the Socialist Party lost its credentials as a working class party was its untimely accession to power in the 80s, where it was obliged to carry out some ferocious attacks on the working class, rather than remaining in opposition like the Labour Party in the UK. And this inability to conform to an international strategy of the ruling class was an indication of this historic incoherence of the French ruling class and its political machinery.

The capitalist left against the working class

In France, there was more enthusiasm in the streets for the “defeat” suffered by RN than for the “triumph” of Labour in the UK. The blocking of RN from government meant that some of its more openly repressive and racist policies against immigrants and Muslims would not be put into effect, and this no doubt was felt as a relief to many, above all those from an immigrant background. But this enthusiasm contains real dangers, above all the idea that the left is really on the side of the workers, and that capitalism is only represented by the far right or Macron’s neo-liberalism.

The very fact that the left parties have played such a crucial part in the effort to block the RN is proof of the bourgeois nature of the left. Populism is certainly an enemy of the working class, but it is not the only one, and combining with other parties to bring stability to the existing political apparatus is an action in the service of capitalism and its state. Moreover, since this action is carried out in the name of defending democracy against fascism, it is a means of reinforcing the fraudulent ideology of democracy. Let us not forget the role that the left has played in the past to save capitalism in its hours of need: from World War One when the opportunists of Social Democracy put the interests of the nation above the interests of the international working class and helped recruit the workers for the war fronts; to the German revolution of 1918 when the Social Democratic government acted as the “blood-hound” of the counter-revolution, using the proto-fascist Frei Korps to crush the insurrectionary workers; and most tellingly, to the 1930s when the “original” Popular Fronts helped to prepare the working class for the slaughter of the Second World War, precisely in the same of defending democracy against fascism.

The working class should have no illusion that those who take part in the bourgeois political machine, whether from the right or the left, are there to protect the workers from attacks on their living standards. On the contrary, the only option for a bourgeois government and the parties within it, faced with a capitalist system which is falling apart at the seams, is to demand sacrifices by the working class in the name of defending the national economy and its imperialist interests, up to and including sacrificing themselves on the altar of war. We have already seen this amply demonstrated by Blair’s New Labour government in Britain and Mitterand’s Socialist Party government in France[1].

The defence of workers’ interests lies not in the ballot box or in putting our trust in the parties of the enemy class. It can only be based on the independent, collective struggles of the workers as a class against all attacks on our living and working conditions, and on our very lives, whether these attacks come from the right or the left wings of the ruling class.

Amos

 

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[1] See for example:  Blair’s legacy: A trusty servant of capitalism, World Revolution 304